Normative and ethical imperatives of change in Nigeria’s democratic consolidation by Araoye, Ademola
T H E  T H I N K E R14
AFRICA 
The real challenge is whether this putative new order has the motive 
force to galvanise the necessary popular support for this more ethically 






















Normative and Ethical 
Imperatives of Change 
in Nigeria’s Democratic 
Consolidation
15V o l u m e  6 6  /  2 0 1 5
AFRICA
The 2015 national legislative and presidential elections in Nigeria last March were a 
historic watershed in many respects. 
The elections exposed the elitism and 
conspiratorial underpinnings of the 
subsisting political settlement in the 
country to serious questioning. Yet, 
the prebendal political settlement 
based on patronage among a faction 
of the social, administrative, business-
cum-entrepreneurial elite, working 
in connivance with the political class, 
has long provided the glue holding 
together the clashing and divergent 
elite interests across the amalgamated 
multi-religious, multi-cultural and 
multi-national geo-political space. 
The political settlement was 
negotiated around power-sharing 
and the structure of the rentier state. 
These were secured through the 
alternation of political power between 
the predominantly Muslim north and 
predominantly Christian south and the 
relative neglect of minorities by the 
larger triad of ethno-regional forces 
as an informal strategy to mitigate the 
country's polarisation. In a perverse 
manner therefore, the agreed informal 
and formal political bargains among 
the elite implicated in this settlement 
moved Nigeria closer to overcoming, 
but not quite, the Lucien Pye classic 
multi-dimensional crises of the post-
colonial state. This is the crisis of 
identity, integration, participation, 
distribution and of critical salience, of 
penetration. 
In essence, the common under-
standings forged between the 
rapacious prebendal elites offered 
the chance of freezing, at least in the 
short-term, the fundamental challenges 
to the legitimacy of the construction of 
the Nigerian state space and its internal 
dynamics and workings. But the terms 
of the settlement were not founded on 
any distillation or rationalisation of the 
popular praxis and were accordingly 
elitist as they were not designed to 
advance the interests of the Nigerian 
state and its people. 
Given the contrived nature of the 
political system, crisis had always 
characterised any general election in 
Nigeria, and there had been no general 
election since independence in 1960 
that did not end in serious disputations, 
crisis, violence and even bloodshed. 
Today, it appears that Nigeria is not 
capable of conducting free and fair 
elections that do not end in chaos and 
violence.1 As Frantz Fanon observed in 
the trials and tribulations of national 
consciousness, instead of being the 
coordinated crystallisation of the 
people’s innermost aspirations, instead 
of being the most tangible, popular 
mobilisation, national consciousness 
in the post-colonial context is nothing 
but a crude, empty, fragile, shell.2 
The Nigerian experience has so far 
validated this acute observation.
In concretising these Fanonian 
directives, building and sustaining a 
well-governed state requires responsible 
leaders accountable to the people. It 
requires leadership characterised by a 
level of statesmanship and it needs a 
social contract formed by a committed 
government.3 The political settlement 
emerging from the Nigerian empty 
shell was thus anti-people. It violated 
established principles behind the good 
governance concept that the obligation 
of governors and governments is 
to perform their functions so as to 
promote values of efficiency and 
responsiveness to civil society or the 
people they are answerable to. By 
doing so the government is expected 
to limit corruption or ensure non-
corruptibility, equitable distribution 
of goods, and transparency in the 
allocation of state resources.4 
But as Joy Alemazung notes, this 
is problematic where the system 
is deficient in the right kind of 
democratic constitution and political 
arrangements necessary to safeguard 
constitutionalism, as well as lacking a 
good leadership acting in the interest 
of the people and not for the leaders. 
She further argues that even though 
good governance and democracy 
are far from being synonymous, 
they are necessary for any successful 
political system aiming to establish 
and promote economic and socio-
political development in Africa. Finally 
she cites Anthony Giddens’ definition 
of power in a general sense as the 
capability to intervene in a given set 
of events to alter them. Giddens terms 
this the transformative capacity. In 
democratic governance, the leader or 
the government exercise the power 
they receive from the people to govern 
for the people. This power is granted 
to the governor based on trust that the 
state will represent and fight for their 
common interest.5 
The entrenched Nigerian 
dispensation practically foreclosed 
the possibility of an inclusive social 
contract of all for all on the terms of 
governance of the Nigerian state until, 
hopefully, the last 2015 elections. The 
prevailing political settlement merely 
temporarily put in abeyance the critical 
dilemmas, including the security 
dilemma, that are pervasive in most 
culturally heterogeneously constructed 
post-colonial political spaces. 
To sustain this political arrangement, 
the establishment routinely undertook 
strategic cleansing of its own ranks 
and of opposition forces through 
assassinations that became a part 
of the political culture that was 
institutionalised under the Sani 
Abacha dictatorship. This cleansing 
extended into the Olusegun Obasanjo 
PDP administration with the political 
assassination of major political elites, 
including the Attorney General, Bola 
Ige, and other prominent citizens 
such as Harry Marshal, reaching its 
routinised crescendo. The orchestrated 
political killings under the Obasanjo 
administration remain unresolved.
The deficiencies in the political 
arrangement, the absolute lack of 
transformative capacity of the elite, 
set the course for the emergence of 
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state where the state was merely a 
set of instruments of domination. 
The regimes, applying the underhand 
rules, principles, norms and modes 
of interaction that governed the 
interaction among contesting and 
contending social groups and the state 
organs that emerged delegitimised 
this normative Nigerian state. These 
paradoxes drove the last elections. 
The opposition All Peoples Congress 
(APC) reflects a realignment of political 
forces and is stronger than any of its 
predecessors that ever challenged 
the established Nigerian political 
settlement and status quo. The 
outcome of the elections constituted 
the first democratically sanctioned 
major assault on this contrived 
Weberian national order and also saw 
the emergence of the first political 
organisation of a national character 
to overtly repudiate the integrity of 
the fundamentals of the formal and 
informal unethical internal operating 
principles of the Nigerian state. 
Credible attempts to institute profound 
change in the governance paradigm 
and to reconfigure the national ethical 
plane in the past had been violently 
quashed and frustrated, with dire 
consequences for the evolutionary 
path of the Nigerian state and society.
From the March 2015 elections 
emerged clearly defined national 
normative and ethical imperatives 
against historic impediments that have 
militated against the Nigerian sense 
of nationhood: ethno-regional and 
religious affinities. It may be surmised 
that a clear power transition from 
a very destructive status quo elite 
constituency has taken place in favour 
of a perceived progressive ethical 
political charge in Nigeria. This is ready 
to deconstruct the extant political 
settlement with a view to dismantling 
the entrenched regime of national 
governance as well as upending a 
political culture rooted in an atrociously 
efficient Nigerian national prebendal 
order. It is in this connection that, 
according to Muhammadu Buhari, his 
mission is to stop corruption and make 
the ordinary people, the weak and the 
vulnerable, the new top priority. 
The real challenge is whether this 
putative new order has the motive 
force to galvanise the necessary 
popular support for this more 
ethically grounded democratic 
dispensation in Nigeria’s public life. 
This recalibration of the normative and 
ethical impulses of state and society 
in Nigeria naturally encapsulates 
the most salient dimensions of a 
consolidated democracy: holistic 
social emancipation and the freedoms 
inherent to this emancipation; 
morality in public space; transparency, 
accountability; altruism; universality 
in national operating principles; and 
meritocracy. Against this background, 
the parameters of Nigeria’s consolidated 
democracy have therefore to transcend 
Schumpetarian notions of mere process 
focused periodic electioneering that 
is the norm in most of Africa and has 
been the hallmark of Nigeria’s mangled 
engagement with the caricature of 
democracy that was institutionalised 
under and by the colonial forces that 
led to independence on 1 October, 
1960.       
Described by Nobel Laureate Wole 
Soyinka as the “most expensive, most 
prodigal, wasteful, senseless, I mean 
really insensitive in terms of what 
people live on in this country” and 
“the real naira-dollar extravaganza 
spent on just subverting, shall we say, 
the natural choices of people,”6 the 
March 2015 elections presented many 
haunting paradoxes. These paradoxes 
were in perceptions of diametrically 
opposed symbolic representations, 
and in actuality, of the incumbent 
president, Goodluck Jonathan, and his 
challenger Muhammadu Buhari. The 
former, as the public face of the post-
Abacha national trauma new republic, 
that is in actuality signposted by the 
Olusegun Obasanjo administration, 
Goodluck Jonathan was caricatured as 
personifying the entrenched decadent 
status quo founded on a discredited 
political settlement. The latter, a 
former military dictator, was cast as a 
born again opposition democrat who 
was popularly perceived as leading the 
vanguard of an emergent new hopeful 
and sanitised Nigerian democratic 
dispensation. 
The line was drawn in the sand. 
Observers suggested that the historic 
antagonists of the Nigerian state and 
society were said to be bold, bogus, 
gaudy, vainglorious, pretentious and 
shameless. They had no scruples 
whatsoever. They were bandits blatant 
in their debasement. They were 
rapacious, predatory and plundering. 
They were ferocious, voracious 
and furious. They were marauding, 
murderous and mendacious. They 
were deceitful, deceptive and 
duplicitous. They didn’t give a damn 
about Nigerians or Nigeria as a country 
as long as they were able to loot 
without let or hindrance. They coveted 
and chased power by all and any 
means necessary to be able to impede 
the long arm of the law and protect 
their plunder.7 
Therefore, at a more defining 
level, the elements of these paradoxes 
included sharp moral dichotomies 
and tensions that cascaded from the 
unambiguous clarity of the ethical and 
normative gulf that was implicit in the 
ethic-driven populist change mantra of 
the opposition and the defence of the 
status quo by the extant administration. 
These sharp ethical differentiations 
notwithstanding, the counter poise to 
these imperatives was the convenient 
horse trading and the calculated, and 
some would say strategic, defections 
from the core caucus of the status quo 
forces.  Such defections carried with 
them threats of undermining not only 
the very fundamentals of the change of 
revolutionary proportions envisaged, 
but also compromised the very vessel 
of a change that was most unwanted 
by the beneficiaries and guardians 
of the troubling Nigerian status quo. 
Popular definitions and perceptions 
of the normative and ethical 
obligations demanded, as well as the 
task of national rejuvenation, were 
associated with already established 
and acknowledged populist moral 
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benchmarks to be attained for national 
redemption. These paradoxes and 
the challenges integral to them have 
remained at the heart of a dampened 
and sluggish momentum for the 
anticipated change so far generated by 
the process.
Scott Sonenshein, in investigations 
focused on the corporate world, 
provides an interesting conceptual 
framework to explore the challenges of 
the normative and ethical imperatives 
of change in Nigeria’s democratic 
consolidation. In the context of 
strategic change, he described the 
emergence of three ethical issues 
and builds a theory to explain how 
this emergence unfolds. He found 
that some employees reframe the 
meaning of strategic issues as involving 
ethical implications because of trigger 
points, ambiguity, and the use of an 
available employee welfare frame. 
Sonnenshein argues that employees 
take the meaning of strategic issues and 
reinterpret them as either leading to 
harmful consequences or the violation 
of a right. In summing up the relevant 
literature on this issue, he highlights 
the fact that main primary literatures 
addressing how ethical issues arise 
converge in primarily treating ethical 
issues as objective properties, that 
is, as existing in the environment 
independent of individuals’ meaning 
constructions, and also as something 
individuals respond to rather than 
create.8
Sonnenshein’s framework helps 
to understand the framing of the 
normative and ethical challenges of 
the status quo in Nigeria, especially 
in the run up to the presidential 
elections. The trigger points or issues 
in this instance were abundant and 
undoubtedly impacted on the welfare 
of Nigerians with their harmful 
consequences. The change mantra 
had ceased to be philosophical. It had 
acquired an existential salience for the 
very concept of the Nigerian state. The 
change wasn't about displacing the 
People’s Democratic Party (PDP), or 
even getting victory at the polls, but 
about managing the difficult choices 
called for in the normative exigencies 
facing the nation, and in accepting the 
ethical realignments for greater good. 
That is change. 
But that exactly expressed the 
problem of a nearly compromised 
vessel for change in an APC as status 
quo forces entrenched in its ranks 
bared their fangs almost immediately 
after the inauguration of a new 
democratically elected President 
Muhammadu Buhari. 
Bisi Akande, former chairman 
who for the most part directed the 
navigation of the APC through the many 
minefields laid by the PDP during a 
difficult registration process, noted that 
the ultimate aim of forces behind what 
he described as a rebellion within the 
APC was to make nonsense of the full-
scale war against corruption promised 
by the Buhari-led administration. He 
explained that most of the northern 
elite, the Nigerian oil subsidy barons 
and other business cartels who never 
liked Buhari’s anti-corruption political 
stance were quickly backing the 
rebellion against the APC with strong 
support. “While other position seekers 
are waiting in the wings until Buhari’s 
ministers are announced, a large 
section of the South-West sees the 
rebellion as a conspiracy of the North 
against the Yoruba,” he added. 
Akande alleged that the 
destabilisation plot against the APC 
actually began shortly after the party 
won the presidential poll, with some 
members of the People’s Democratic 
Party (PDP) extraction in the merger 
party holding a secret meeting in 
Abuja on how to hijack the party. He 
observed that many of those calling 
themselves businessmen in Nigeria act 
like leeches, sucking the nation’s blood 
through various state governments 
and particularly through the PDP-led 
Federal Government. While all these 
schisms were going on in the APC, 
those who were jittery of Buhari’s 
constant threat of an anti-corruption 
battle began to encourage and finance 
rebellions against the APC’s democratic 
positions, which led to the emergence 
of Senator Saraki as the candidate of 
the PDP tendencies inside and outside 
APC.
This driving template for the much 
awaited change was forged in the 
crucible of a damning historicity of 
the Nigeria state process that was 
predicated on the seemingly intractable 
permanence of a harmful anomie 
characterising its society. 
In this expansive and dense den 
of all pervading quackery, resting 
on entrenched systemic illogic, false 
and omniscient self-serving political 
hegemons and bestriding impostor 
social oracles multiplied. These 
produced retrogressive projections 
of crude affirmations of sub-national 
quotas, bogus communal and massively 
deformed individual spirituality thriving 
in hues of vacuous national salvations 
peddled by ubiquitous morally moronic 
Tartuftes as well as ascendant fresh 
brother Jeroboams still wearing their 
talismans and large golden crosses, 
engrossed in patented commercialised 
political religiosity. These are retailed 
in the dilapidated cathedrals of the 
Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), 
in second hand markets stalls with the 
tantalising glitz of unbridled and naked 
sensuousness and collapsed brothels 
of synagogues of false vendors of 
Pentecostal abracadabra. 
To this mix is added the utter 
devastation of communities and 
individual fortunes in the senselessness 
of the bloody campaign of Boko Haram 
that had long rejected the status quo 
in imitative preference of a resurgent 
global millennial madness expressed 
in the form of an Islamic caliphate. 
These were to be fulfilled through a 
horrific killing machinery of externally 
inspired and locally grown Islamic 
fundamentalism. These constituted 
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rejected status quo. 
The old political settlement was 
deconstructed through many prisms. A 
people-fashioned template, a mental 
strategic blueprint for integral and 
holistic emancipation in the imagination 
of the desperate lumpen masses stuck 
in the very pit of national dispossession, 
was constantly pitched in confrontation 
with the systematically orchestrated 
suffocating systemic odour and the 
moral and ethical turpitude that defined 
the Nigerian state and its society. 
Many in diasporic bewilderment 
waxed mythological and biblical about 
the horrendous ledger of the status quo. 
It was exuded in these constituencies 
of faith healers that any party with 
the name People’s Democratic Party 
was doomed forever in the history of 
Nigeria. Repeatedly, it was affirmed 
that the PDP will never win elections 
at the centre, never, ever again in the 
history of Nigeria. Its members were 
challenged to write down a biblical 
memorial. “These are the words of 
the Lord to the remnants of the PDP 
as contained in Exodus 17: 14: ‘Then 
the Lord said to Moses, "Write this on a 
scroll as something to be remembered 
and make sure that Joshua hears it, 
because I will completely blot out the 
name of Amalek from under heaven.’9
Others, more secular and practical, 
with their feet rooted in terra firma, 
observed the consequences of 
corruption in bringing the Nigerian 
state to its knees. In this connection, 
Kolawole Olaniran noted that the near 
bankruptcy of the Nigerian state could 
be traced to a sector of the economy: 
institutionalised corruption. He said 
that Nigeria was broke and the fact that 
several of its 36 states had not been 
able to pay their workers’ salaries was 
hardly surprising given that for many 
years the country had fallen victim to 
systematic stealing by career politicians 
and soldiers dabbling in politics. 
Previously considered a matter of 
“little brown envelopes” he noted that 
corruption had metamorphosed into 
a “profitable business” for politicians 
(and their families and friends, the 
so-called go-betweens or ‘looting 
pipes’), corporations and financial 
institutions and centres. 
Waxing moral on the debilitating 
state of the economy, Olaniran asserted 
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that stealing was odious, illegal and 
immoral but that stolen funds don’t 
stink, as corrupt officials continued to 
empty the public treasuries for personal 
gains – to amass luxury cars, buy 
extravagant homes, and enjoy exotic 
vacations – to the amazement and 
anger of millions of Nigerians. Images 
of government officials lining their 
pockets with the treasure of the poor 
are stark and raw. The abundance of 
wealth of the ruling class stood in stark 
contrast to the poverty of the majority 
of Nigerians. Finally, he proposed that 
allowing corrupt officials to benefit 
from their crime has a degenerative 
effect on the institutions of governance, 
human rights and the rule of law. 
Meanwhile, an elite constituency 
of the damned in Nigerian public 
life was further defined by Remi 
Oyeyemi. He  asserts that this group, 
who also camouflage as friends of the 
President, are willing to use President 
Buhari as a sacrificial lamb for their 
end goal. And that is exactly what they 
want, to pave the way for their own 
diabolical plans. He described them 
as possessing a lot of resources they 
stole from under the nose of Olusegun 
Obasanjo-Onyejekwe. Some present 
and past governors belong to this 
group. They are generous to a fault and 
are ardent believers in Babangidaism 
– a philosophy that everyone has a 
price and can be bought! They will 
spend any amount of naira, pounds 
sterling, dollars and euros to win and 
achieve their objective. They are 
crass opportunists. He concludes that 
the leading lights of this group have 
international criminal records and are 
pariahs in some Western countries.
This debilitating public perception of 
the status quo was corroborated by the 
unending blight of scandals that engulfed 
the pivotal economic institutions. By 
2011 speculation was rife that that the 
proceeds of an alleged bribe by Nigerian 
big oil players may have helped to 
finance a twenty million dollar Vienna 
home whose purchase was traced to 
the country’s Minister for Petroleum 
Resources. By late 2014, the central 
bank found that between January 2012 
and July 2013 NNPC lifted 594 million 
barrels of crude oil valued at $65 billon, 
and out of that amount NNPC only 
repatriated $15 billion, representing 
24 percent of the value. That meant 
the NNPC was yet to account for, and 
repatriate to the Federation Account, an 
amount in excess of $49.804 billion or 
76 percent of the value of oil lifted in 
the same period. 
While this played out, key allies of 
the President in the administration were 
drowning in all manner of allegations of 
scandalous transactions. In April, 2014, 
Minister of Aviation, Stella Oduah, was 
invited by the Economic and Financial 
Crimes Commission to shed light on 
the purchase of two BMW bulletproof 
cars by the Nigeria Civil Aviation 
Authority at a controversial sum of 
N255m. In October, 2014, the House 
of Representatives urged the President 
to review the continued engagement 
of the Minister of Aviation for having 
contravened the Appropriation Act, 
2013 by exceeding the Ministry of 
Aviation’s approval limit of N100m 
in the purchase of 54 vehicles valued 
at N643m. By July 2015, the former 
Head of Service of the Federation, 
Stephen Oronsaye had been docked 
over his alleged complicity in a 
money laundering and contract scam 
amounting to about N1.9billion.10 
The most cited evidence was in the 
salaries and perquisites of the President, 
through to legislators, and down to 
operatives at the local government 
level. On assuming office, President 
Muhammadu Buhari summarily 
slashed his and the Vice President’s 
salary by 50% even as he refused the 
offer of four armoured limousines at 
the cost of four hundred million Naira. 
Meanwhile, the post PDP national 
resurgence suffered a setback when 
allegations surfaced that the key 
defectors from the PDP to the APC had 
forged the internal rules of procedures 
of the Senate in order to produce a 
PDP-aligned Senate President. This 
was interpreted as a sharp move by 
reactionary elements with a view to 
undercutting the profound change 
agenda that threatened the discredited 
political settlement which had been 
repudiated at the polls.  
The details of the remuneration of 
a Nigerian Senator is detailed below;
* Basic Salary monthly (BS) – 
N2,484,245.50
* Hardship Allowance (50% of B.S) – 
N1,242,122.70
* Constituency Allowance (200% of 
B.S) – N4,968,509.00
* Newspapers Allowance (50% of B.S) 
– N1,242,122.70
* Wardrobe Allowance (25% of B.S) – 
N621,061.37
* Recess Allowance (10% of B.S) – 
N248,424.55
* Accommodation (200% of B.S) – 
N4,968,509.00
* Utilities (30% of B.S) – N828,081.83
* Domestic Staff (70% of B.S) – 
N1,863,184.12
* Entertainment (30% of B.S) – 
N828,081.83
* Personal Assistants (25% of B.S) – 
N621,061.12
* Vehicle Maintenance Allowance 
(75% of B.S) – N1,863,184.12
* Leave Allowance (10% of B.S) – 
N248,424.55
* Severance Gratuity (300% of B.S) – 
N7,452,736.50
* Car Allowance (400% of B.S) – 
N9,936,982.00
* TOTAL MONTHLY SALARY = 
N29,479,749.00 ($181,974.00)
* TOTAL YEARLY SALARY 
= N29,479,749.00 x 
12 = N353,756,988.00 
(US$ 2,183,685.00)
* EXCHANGE RATE: $1 = N162
In comparative terms, a Nigerian 
senator earns more in salary than 
President Barack Obama of the United 
States and David Cameron of the UK. 
An Indian lawmaker must work for at 
least 49 years to earn the annual salary 
of a Nigerian senator. In the United 
States, while the minimum wage is 
$1,257 (N191, 667), a US lawmaker 
earns $15,080 (N2.3m) per month. 
In the United Kingdom, a lawmaker 
earns $8,686 (N1.3m) monthly while 
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the gross national minimum wage is 
$1,883 (N283, 333) per month. Also, 
Nigerian lawmakers earn higher than 
their counterparts in Sweden. With 
a monthly pay of $7,707 (N1.2m), 
a lawmaker in Sweden will need 
to work for over 12 years to equal 
what a Nigerian senator earns per 
annum. The president of the United 
States takes home an annual salary of 
$400,000 (N64.156,0m), including a 
$50,000 expense allowance making 
the president the highest paid public 
servant in the US. The $400,000 
includes everything and $350,000 out 
of it is taxable.
In terms of lawmakers’ salaries as 
a ratio of GDP per capita, the gap is 
even much wider. While the salary of 
a Nigerian lawmaker is 116 times the 
country’s GDP per person, that of a 
British member of parliament is just 2.7 
times. The average salary of a Nigerian 
worker based on the national minimum 
wage is N18,000.00, So, the yearly salary 
is N18,000.00 x 12 = N216,000.00 
($1,333.00). The proportion of the 
yearly Salary of Nigerian Senator = 
$2,183,685.00.to the Nigerian worker 
is $2,183,685.00/$1,333.00 = 1,638. 
It will take an average Nigerian worker 
1,638 years to earn the yearly salary 
of a Nigerian Senator. Surveying the 
depressing situation, the Nobel laureate 
Wole Soyinka, who has acquired the 
toga of a national conscience, decried 
the Nigerian legislature as a "nest of 
thieves".
Given the threat to the pecuniary 
dimensions of the political settlement, 
the fight back by the PDP elements 
ensconced in the Buhari APC change 
machinery, through the subversion 
of party primacy and superiority,  is 
consistent with the history of the 
turbulence that has been associated 
with previously attempts at radical 
change in Nigeria or, in the words 
of the laureate and national sage, to 
reconstruct and address some really 
fundamental issues of society, the 
danger of a lurking sinister force, a very 
sinister force in control and a sinister 
cabal for that matter, that could derail 
the change process. 
This apprehension has remained 
a permanent feature of the emerging 
political process. The 1966 coup of 
the three radical colonels, controversial 
though it remains on its true intents, 
was quashed and directly led to the civil 
war. In 1976, national hero General 
Murtala Ramat Mohammed was 
assassinated in broad daylight for his 
daring vision of a progressive Nigeria. 
Again in 1985, status quo elements, led 
by articulator of northern hegemony 
and self-proclaimed military president, 
General Ibrahim Babaginda, removed 
equally northern aligned reformists 
Generals Muhammadu Buhari and 
Tunde Idiagbon from office to pave 
the way to national depravity that 
culminated in the rise of the rampaging 
maximum ruler General Sani Abacha. 
Sani Abacha is also reputed to be 
an irrepressible thief of all time. In 
the course of meetings between the 
Nigerian team and authorities in about 
four other jurisdictions as well as the 
team from the foreign legal firm, it was 
discovered that a lot of underhand 
dealings must have taken place in the 
recovery of the Abacha’s loot. This 
was largely responsible for the under-
declaration of what has been recovered 
so far by three successive governments 
and worse still what is still trapped in 
offshore accounts, which, in the most 
current estimation, based on the last 
meeting with the engaged foreign 
team, stands at US$210 billion!!!11 
In the prevailing political settlement 
of which the three PDP administrations 
were legatees, national monuments 
are still named after Sani Abacha, the 
judicial murderer and assassin of Ken 
SaroWiwa and many other prominent 
national resistance figures, among 
whom were Alfred Rewane and 
Kudirat Abiola, wife of the Moshood 
Abiola who is generally regarded 
as the only Nigerian president to 
have emerged through transparently 
conducted elections on 12 June, 
1993 with a truly nationally acclaimed 
mandate. Sani Abacha’s family and 
Major Al Mustapha, leader of Abacha’s 
North Korea trained killer goons, like 
many other odious characters in the 
public domain, were rehabilitated 
by President Goodluck Jonathan, 
consistent with the internal workings of 
the old settlement. 
These political conveniences were 
all in consonance with the protocols 
of Nigeria’s national debauchery 
deriving from its nebulous political 
settlement. Therefore, the stakes in 
the change calculus are high and 
the management of the process of 
dismantling these normative and 
ethical complexities import potentially 
determinant consequences for the 
evolution and overall trajectory of the 
Nigerian state and society. This is more 
so against the troubling implications of 
the recrudescent slide to primordial 
allegiances that were manifestly clear in 
the last elections. All the northern states 
voted as in the past in the direction 
of northerner Muhammadu Buhari. 
The ethno-regional votes in the South 
East and the South South geo-political 
regions were monolithic in favour home 
boy incumbent Goodluck Jonathan. 
The real arrowhead for change would 
then be interpreted to be the South 
West political zone, easily recognised 
as the regional constituency with the 
most cosmopolitan and sophisticated 
political sensibilities that had not 
ventured to partake in governance at 
the federal centre throughout Nigeria’s 
political evolution until the March 2015 
elections. The robust internal discourse 
on the elections in this region was 
reflected in the outcome of the elections 
both at the legislative and presidential 
levels where the change train had only 
an edge over the incumbent president. 
In fact the incumbent President 
Jonathan won in Ekiti state in that 
political zone. On the basis of this, some 
have argued that the outcome of the 
elections merely reflected a realignment 
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of the old horses behind the Nigerian 
political settlement among the ethnic 
constituencies of Nigeria; and that not 
much should be read into the outcome 
of the 2015 elections in projecting the 
long term character of the Nigerian 
state. This perspective is indeed also 
well founded.
These paralysing imperatives 
seemingly resonated across the board 
as the legitimate platform for change 
for the anticipated new political 
seasons in Nigeria’s much abused 
post-Abacha democratic dispensation. 
Nigeria’s elections and the expected 
democratic consolidation, after twelve 
years of unabashed political chicanery, 
transcended the Schumpetarian notions 
of mere procedural democracy and a 
mild expectation of the entrenchment 
of democratic tenets and values. In 
the process focused Schumpetarian 
demarcations, democracy is only a 
method and of no intrinsic value with 
its sole function to select leaders. In 
any case, according to Schumpeter, 
these leaders impose their views 
and are not controlled by voters.12 
That was indeed the hallmark of the 
post-Abacha PDP Schumpeterian 
democratic dispensation of Olusegun 
Obasanjo, Umaru Yar’adua and 
Goodluck Jonathan. 
Against this background, democratic 
consolidation  in Nigeria in the context 
of the evolved understandings among 
the people, classically delineated 
the concept as the actual transition 
of power from a morally bankrupt 
and discredited ruling party and its 
two administrations, in this specific 
instance the Olusegun Obasanjo led 
scandal suffused administration and its 
strategic cloning in the successor Umar 
Yar’adua and Goodluck Ebele Jonathan 
regimes of the People’s Democratic 
Party (PDP), to another, an opposition 
political force, the All Peoples Congress 
(APC) and its Muhammadu Buhari 
presidential candidate at the other 
polar end of a normative and ethical-
cum-morality gulf. Indeed the main 
conundrum in the national tragedy was 
the theatrical somersault of Olusegun 
Obasanjo in his public defection from 
a status quo that he built and (more 
than Goodluck Jonathan) personified, 
to the opposition. The overt theatrical 
turnaround of Olusegun Obasanjo, 
a hyper-hypocritical oddity in the 
universe and ranks of a progressive 
Nigeria, was the clearest indication that 
the bottom had fallen off the pedestal 
on which Nigeria’s historic decadence 
was perched. The bastions of national 
decay were giving way as its founding 
lights were opportunistically defecting 
from the sinking boat.  
The election then was at once at 
a profound level the contest of an 
already popularly delegitimised status 
quo power versus oppositional forces 
repudiating the extant ethical and 
moral construction of the Nigerian 
state and society. Given the criticality 
of normative and ethical dimensions 
of the change sought, both in 
state and society as well as in the 
corporate world, the salience of this 
dimension of the struggle for power 
and implications for power transition 
and democratic consolidation cannot 
be underestimated. This is more so 
in light of pervasive malfeasance in 
governance and the corporate world, 
both very exaggerated in Nigeria, as 
an accompaniment to the complete 
and absolute abandonment of the 
moral compass in politics across the 
board. These have elicited increased 
public demand for transparency and 
accountability in national processes 
globally. In Nigeria, the concept of 
change adumbrated in its holistic 
understandings is the struggle to create 
an enabling space to attempt to better 
restructure the normative and ethical 
fundamentals that impel the appalling 
state of the horrendous existential 
expressions and conditions of daily 
life. It is the attempt to employ smart 
strategies to ring-fence and protect the 
fragilised state and society against an 
expansive and destructive ethical and 
normative environment all too capable 
of imploding Nigeria as an existential 
reality of all times.
Meanwhile a final Fanonian 
injunction cautions that by exploding 
the former (colonial) reality, the 
struggle uncovers unknown facts, 
brings to light new meanings and 
underlines contradictions which were 
camouflaged by this reality. Going 
by this masterful prognostication, 
the exposure of the unsavoury reality 
of Nigeria’s discredited political 
settlement and its protocols as well 
as regime can only be consolidated 
through a historic struggle unleashed 
by the people under the guide of a truly 
nationalist leadership that is directed 
by a coordinated crystallisation of the 
people’s innermost aspirations. For 
Fanon, without waging this struggle, 
there may be nothing left but a carnival 
parade and a lot of hot air. Hopefully, 
Nigeria can escape this damning 
prophetic reference at the cusp of its 
potential emancipation by the ballot.■ 
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